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Abstract 
Researchers in peace and conflict studies have rarely explicitly engaged with time and 
temporality. This article develops a temporal analysis of victimhood in a mature post-
transition society, drawing on qualitative research with victims/survivors of gross human 
rights violations in South Africa. Two decades after the democratic transition, there is a 
prevalent understanding that it is finally time for victims to ‘move on’. In contrast to the 
supposed linear temporality of peace processes however, the consequences of past violence 
continue to impact on interviewees’ lives and are exacerbated by contemporary experiences 
of victimisation. I identify several areas of temporal conflicts that characterise post-conflict 
societies: victimhood as temporary/ victimhood as continuous; the pace of national 
reconciliation/ the time(s) of individual healing; and the speed of a neoliberal economy/ the 
pace of social transformation. I examine temporal hierarchies that reflect broader socio-
economic marginalisation, such as being made to wait for compensation and social pressures 
of overcoming the past. This temporal analysis of victimhood thus not only highlights the 
mismatch between victims’ needs and political and cultural expectations of closure, but it 
also draws attention to the temporality of transitional processes and programmes at different 
social and institutional levels. 
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Introduction 
One of the challenges for post-conflict societies lies in establishing fast-paced liberal 
economic regimes that must at the same time gradually deal with long-term issues such as 
redistribution and reconciliation.1 There are temporal conflicts between the demands of 
‘acceleration societies’ (Rosa 2003) and the patience and long time horizon that is required, 
both individually and collectively, for victims’ processes of healing and for sustainable social 
transformation that addresses the root causes of violent conflict and promotes peace. With 
this profound tension in mind between the ongoing needs of victims and societal 
requirements for closure, this article examines how people’s past and present experiences of 
violence impact on their being in time in a post-conflict democratic order. It contributes a 
time-sensitive perspective to the scholarship on victimhood by examining what I call 
temporalities of victimhood. This temporal analysis of victimhood not only underscores how 
victims’ perceptions and needs are at odds with wider society and how ongoing experiences 
of violence and inequality have the potential to bring back traumatic memories from the past, 
but it also draws attention to the temporality of transitional processes and programmes at 
different social and institutional levels. 
Analysing qualitative interviews with victims/survivors of human rights violations 
and field observations, the paper uses South Africa as a case study. Twenty years after the 
end of apartheid, there is a dominant understanding amongst many South Africans that it is 
time for victims of apartheid-era human rights violations to ‘move on’. Indeed, perhaps more 
than any other post-conflict setting, South Africa is regularly portrayed as an example of a 
                                                            
1 The term ‘post-conflict society’ refers to a society where a transition from mass violence to 
no mass violence has taken place. This is sometimes also referred to as ‘post-violence 
society’ in the literature. There are issues with both terms – most significantly that violence 
and conflict are rarely completely eliminated in the new democratic dispensation – but the 
more commonly used phrase of ‘post-conflict’ has been chosen here (also see footnote 2 
below for the distinction between political and social peace).  
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society that has successfully managed past human rights violations. At the same time, 
experiences of apartheid-era victimisation continue to impact on survivors’ lives in a range of 
ways, for example economically, psychologically, emotionally and physically. What is more, 
continuing structural violence in the democratic present can rekindle memories of the past 
and disrupt the supposed linear temporality of the peace process.2 While this dominant linear 
temporality of peace processes and transitional justice sees victimhood as temporary and 
healing as taking place progressively, understandings of victimhood and senses of time 
appear much more cyclical in the narratives that are examined in this article. 
 The paper proceeds in seven stages. The first part reviews relevant literature on time 
in order to develop the concepts of temporalities of victimhood and temporal conflicts. The 
second section discusses the notion of victimhood as it relates to post-conflict societies, 
provides necessary background on the nature of victimhood under apartheid and outlines the 
policies that were adopted to assist victims in the early post-conflict era. Next, 
methodological issues are addressed. Section four begins the discussion of interview data, 
demonstrating that interviewees read the past through contemporary experiences of 
victimisation and inequality.  The next section expands on this finding of a collapsing of past 
and present. It contrasts interviewees’ constructions of victimhood and senses of time as 
continuous, for example in relation to continued segregation, with the dominant conception of 
victimhood as temporary. Part six moves from participants’ temporal experiences to 
exploring the larger social context within which these experiences take place. The 
marginalisation of victims and victimhood in policy and the public sphere is charted, which, 
it is argued, may account for why many participants reported a social pressure or obligation 
                                                            
2 The use of the term ‘peace process’ throughout this paper refers to social peace processes as 
opposed to political peace processes. According to Brewer (2010), social peace processes are 
concerned with societal healing and relationship building after conflict, and therefore include 
not only transitional justice strategies but also policies of social redistribution.   
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to forget the past and ‘move on’.  There is then a disparity between victims’ experiences and 
the expectations others – new and old political and social elites, but also the young born-free 
generation – place on them. Section seven analyses this disparity in terms of a temporal 
conflict between individuals’ own pace of healing and the demands of national reconciliation, 
drawing on examples such as the pardons policy and reparations. In concluding, attention is 
drawn to the temporal conflict between the demands of acceleration societies, and the 
patience that is required to achieve sustainable peace through redress and reconstruction.    
 
1. Time in the study of post-conflict societies 
Within the study of time, contemporary theorists have, to name only a few areas, examined 
the acceleration of time, how time is used and imagined, and how different notions of time 
inform and construct social meaning (see for example Zerubavel 1981; Adam 2004; Rosa 
2003). Recent scholarship in the sociology of time also includes work on temporal 
domination and socio-temporal marginalisation (Auyero 2010; Reid 2013). In accounts of 
post-conflict societies, time is sometimes implicitly considered. Against the common 
assumption that the passing of time can overcome any harm, memory and trauma studies 
have shown that memory representations can become fuel for time bombs in new waves of 
conflict (De Brito, Gonzales-Enriquez et al. 2001; Edkins 2003). In relation to memories of a 
violent past, Volkan (2004) describes a ‘time collapse’ where ideas and feelings connected 
with a group’s ‘chosen trauma’ of the past are folded in with those of a current conflict, with 
old and new events condensed into one. A shared image of the past provides an illusion of 
timelessness that is crucial for the creation of collective identities (Halbwachs & Coser 1992). 
However, rarely do conflict and peace scholars explicitly engage with time and 
temporality. Hinton’s (2013) analysis of the Cambodia Tribunal demonstrates that 
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transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms are based on the idea of a linear temporality, 
constructing concepts of past and present that are highly normative and rendering the present 
liminal. This ‘dichotomous transitional justice time’ serves to erase historical complexities by 
seeking to move the victim that is ‘frozen in time’ and then liberated by TJ practioners into 
an active, progressive citizen in a democratic state (Hinton 2013: 92). In his ethnographic 
work on the everyday lives of survivors in Mozambique, Igreja (2012: 408) likewise critiques 
TJ time as ‘mechanistically […] suggesting a past of violence and a present for justice and 
closure’ and instead proposes to recognise multiple temporalities in order to understand how 
people’s conceptions of justice and healing change. These accounts – by in turn focusing on 
memory and trauma, the temporal modes of TJ institutions and people’s lived time – indicate 
that temporal analyses might provide important insights into the social and political dynamics 
of peace processes.  
In applying such a temporal analysis specifically to the issue of victimhood after mass 
violence, I develop the concept of temporal conflicts in post-conflict societies. I understand 
temporal conflicts as differences in experiences, constructions and uses of time amongst 
people, groups, societies or institutions that can give rise to or legitimate power relations. The 
term emphasises that, while we are always caught in different speeds or times which can help 
us to understand lived experiences, there exist dominant forms of time and temporal 
hierarchies, which allow the marginalisation of particular groups, their temporalities and their 
lived experiences. Temporal conflicts in relation to the analysis in this article include several 
interrelated dimensions: dominant understandings of victimhood as temporary vis-à-vis 
experiences of victimhood as continuous and cyclical (this is particularly examined in 
sections 4 and 5), and the pace of national reconciliation vis-à-vis the pace of individual 
healing (section 7). Moreover, there is a broader temporal conflict between the (fast) speed of 
a neoliberal globalised economy and the (slow) pace of social transformation and redress. 
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Scholars of time have demonstrated a range of ways in which time becomes the object 
of social control and temporal power relations are shaped, for example in relation to gender 
(including work time, household labour, family schedules and singlehood; see Bryson 2007, 
Lahad 2012), sexuality and sexual difference (Halberstam 2005), employment and illness 
(Charmaz 1997) and how social events reflect particular dominant temporal expectations 
(Zerubavel 1981). There are inequalities in how time is used and whose time is valued: of 
particular interest in this article is waiting, which is stratified, mirrors unequal power 
relations (Schwartz 1975) and modifies the behaviours of those who are waiting (Bourdieu 
2000). An emerging body of literature on the politics of waiting highlights making 
(subordinate) people wait as a strategy of temporal domination by the state, which can have 
disastrous effects on the emotional and material well-being of people and can exacerbate 
social inequalities, affecting those without resources disproportionally more severely (Auyero 
2012; Reid 2013). Drawing on this literature on time and power – particularly in relation to 
societal expectations on victims to move on and victims' long wait for change – allows me to 
theorise their ongoing experience of victimhood in terms of a failure to conform to dominant 
transitional justice time. First however, some background on concepts of victimhood and how 
South Africa dealt with the victims of apartheid violence is necessary.   
 
2. Forms of victimhood and ways of dealing with the legacies of the past 
Whereas time has been largely ignored in studies of transitional and post-conflict societies, 
there is a rich literature on victimhood. The question of who is considered a victim (or 
survivor), who speaks for victims, and how victimhood is deployed is central to all peace 
processes. Cultures and discourses of victimhood are distinct from the experiences and 
actions of actual victims (Breen-Smyth 2007). Victimhood can be politicised and 
manipulated, such as when hierarchies of victimhood and suffering are established, when 
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victim groups become associated with movements or parties, or when notions of victimhood 
are deployed in order to legitimise further violence (Brewer 2010; Breen-Smyth 2007). 
Indeed, the very categorisation of victims and of perpetrators can be highly contested and TJ 
scholarship has increasingly questioned what might be called the victim-perpetrator 
dichotomy, arguing instead for more complex constructions of victimhood (Bouris 2007). In 
this study too, some interviewees were victims and perpetrators. Nonetheless, an ideal of the 
victim as innocent, morally superior and lacking responsibility continues to dominate, and it 
is this ideal that gives rise to hierarchies of victimhood and might lead to the exclusion of 
particular groups or to narrowly conceived victim policies (Bouris 2007; also see Borer 2003 
and Fullard 2004 on South Africa).  
South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994 were preceded by fifty years of 
legislated racial oppression under National Party rule, with race determining individuals’ 
access to political rights, opportunity, education, employment and health.3 All ‘Blacks’, 
‘Indians’ and ‘Coloureds’, to use the apartheid-era classification terms, were victims of the 
regime, although it did not affect the three ‘non-white’ groups evenly. To give two examples 
for apartheid legislation, the Bantu Education Act (1953) enforced separate education, 
designed to equip the black population only with the skills necessary for the lowest ranks of 
the labour market. The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) led to a programme of forced removals 
of three and a half million black people into ten supposedly distinct ethnic homelands or 
‘Bantustans’: arid lands with no industries or infrastructure, which only made up 13 % of the 
South African territory. Huge shantytowns also emerged that provided white areas with cheap 
labour. Spatial segregation continues to characterise present day South Africa; indeed, the 
lack of educational and residential integration were amongst the main issues interviewees 
                                                            
3 However, apartheid built on the foundations laid by previous segregationist regimes such as 
British colonialism. 
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cited as apartheid’s lasting legacy on their lives. Those who were opposed to the regime were 
subjected to violent repression. The liberation struggle became militarised from the 1960s 
onwards, but many of the activist participants in this study were involved in the broad-based 
non-violent resistance movement, the United Democratic Front. 21,000 people were killed as 
a result of political violence. 
Victim support policies after 1994 were intertwined with the workings of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which famously provided conditional amnesty in 
exchange for the disclosure of knowledge of human rights violations. The commission set out 
to investigate gross human rights violations between 1960 and 1994, defined as ‘killing, 
abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment […] carried out or planned by any person acting 
with a political motive’ (TRC 1998: vol. 5: 10). Crucially, this definition therefore excluded 
victimisation experiences that resulted from the structural violence of apartheid.4 From 
20,000 submissions, the TRC classified 29,000 victims and documented 47,000 gross 
violations of human rights. The commission was also charged with developing a reparation 
and rehabilitation policy, which resulted in recommendations for a reparations grant, 
symbolic reparation, community rehabilitation programmes and institutional reform measures 
(ibid.). While individual grants were paid out (albeit late and at a reduced sum) and some 
symbolic reparation was undertaken, government has to date not implemented other aspects 
of the TRC’s reparations policy. At the time of writing, over twenty years after the end of 
apartheid, there are regular protests by victims campaigning for a full implementation of the 
TRC’s recommendations and a re-opening of the registration process. It has recently emerged 
                                                            
4 As the TRC report put it, ‘the Commission’s focus was […] a restricted one, representing 
what were perhaps some of the worst acts committed against the people of this country and 
region in the post-1960 period, but providing a picture that is by no means complete […] 
millions of South Africans, and more particularly those who were not white, were subjected 
to racial and ethnic oppression and discrimination on a daily basis’ (TRC, 1998: vol. 1: 29).  
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that the President’s Reparations Fund currently holds over R1.1 billion (about £60 million). 
Due to interest, this is more than it did before paying out individual compensation for victims 
in 2003 (Gontsana 2013). 
General redistributive policies, such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
legislation, were also adopted. They sought to eradicate structural inequalities (and might 
therefore be understood as aimed at the majority of the population affected by apartheid’s 
structural violence) but did not specifically address victims as defined by the TRC. 
Nonetheless, South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.69 (National Planning Commission 2012). Over half of South African 
children live in poverty; 20 % of people live in extreme poverty; and just under 1 in 4 people 
live without formal housing. Unemployment stands at 35.6 %, with South Africans between 
the ages of 15 and 34 years constituting 71 % of all unemployed South Africans (Statistics 
SA 2012).  
These inequalities are in part legacies of uneven development under colonialism and 
apartheid, but they are also the product of policies adopted since the democratic transition. 
Trade liberalisation, a shift to investment spending, export-oriented manufacturing, 
privatisation of state enterprises, wage control and progressive flexibility of the labour market 
were adopted in order to foster higher economic growth and private capital investment. These 
neoliberal policies of the first democratic decade yielded moderate but unequalising growth, 
with capital the primary beneficiary. Conversely, large numbers of organised workers were 
retrenched, casualised or forced into the informal economy. This background on the adoption 
of a neoliberal economic regime in the early post-conflict era is significant here for two 
reasons: one, because it led to the emergence of new inequalities with ‘trickle down’ 
economics not working for the victims of apartheid’s structural violence; and two, because in 
temporal terms economic neoliberalism is fast-paced, focused on speed, immediacy, and a 
11 
 
short-time horizon (Jessop 2009; Hassan 2009).  This stands in contrast to the considerably 
longer time horizon of programmes for social reconstruction, redistribution and reparation.  
 It is important to briefly clarify the usage of the terms ‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ in this 
article.5 Only about one third of interviewees described themselves as a victim (and just 
under that proportion preferred the term survivor), irrespective of the fact that they met the 
definition put forward by the TRC. Respondents cited a number of reasons for rejecting the 
term victim. Many ascribed themselves an active role and associated victim status with 
passivity; others with an unforgiving attitude that they rejected; some compared themselves 
to other victims and judged the degree of their victimisation to be lesser. Other words used to 
describe their identity in relation to the conflict of the past were ‘freedom fighter’, ‘victor’ or 
‘activist-survivor’. Notably, the term victim was most commonly used by interviewees not in 
relation to past victimisation but to their life circumstances in the present, as in the following 
extract: ‘I was a freedom fighter, I was an activist. I mean, I am still a victim, in this context, 
in Mossel Bay. Even today I am harassed by the system here.’6 It is central to the arguments 
brought forward here that interviewees often discussed victimhood in relation to their 
present-day experiences, for instance of poverty, unemployment or violence. 
 
3. Methodology 
This study included 38 interviews with victims/survivors of apartheid-era gross human rights 
                                                            
5 I acknowledge the debates around the problematic use of the term ‘victim’ and that there is 
a preference in some strands of the transitional justice literature to use the term ‘survivor’ 
(also see the literature reviewed in the beginning of this section). As I show below however, 
neither was universally accepted by participants in relation to the violations they had 
experienced in the past. I therefore use the term victim in this article to highlight that people 
have experienced, and often continue to experience, human rights violations but do not 
necessarily imply that they chose to define themselves as ‘victim’.    
6 Interview with Themba (49 years, male), 22 November 2011, Mossel Bay. 
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violations that were conducted during four months of fieldwork in 2011.7 All interviews were 
conducted in the Western Cape Province, in a mixture of urban (Cape Town and Cape Flats 
townships; 25 interviews) and semi-urban or rural (Oudtshoorn, George, Mossel Bay; 13 
interviews) settings, and in most cases at participants’ homes.8 8 participants were female, 19 
historically defined black, 18 historically defined coloured and one historically defined white. 
The Western Cape is unique in terms of its demographic composition, with a larger 
percentage of the population being historically defined coloured and white than in any other 
province. As with other provinces, victim experiences and the forms violence took are 
distinct (TRC 1998).  
Participants were recruited through NGOs, personal contacts established in earlier 
periods of fieldwork conducted by the author, and through snowball sampling. They were 
provided with information about the purpose of the study and its focus areas in advance, with 
an interpreter being available to assist where necessary.9 Interviews were semi-structured, 
addressing themes such as victim identity, compensation, justice, reconciliation, present 
socio-economic conditions and hopes for the future.10 Mindful of concerns around the 
‘production of victims’ (Madlingozi 2010), participants were not directly asked to recount 
                                                            
7 All interviewees had experienced gross human rights violations as outlined by the TRC (see 
above for the definition), as well as experiencing the structural, legislated-for, violence of 
apartheid.  
8 Participants were given first-name synonyms. Ages, where indicated, were correct at the 
time of interview. 
9 Consent was obtained prior to interviewing, but at various points of the interview 
participants were asked again to confirm that they were happy to continue.  
10 Using interviews as a primary method produces particular outcomes that are related to 
one’s own positioning (Coffey 1999). In this study, this is amplified by the positionality of 
the author as a white European researcher that, bar one exception, interviewed historically 
defined black and coloured South Africans about their experiences. Although the perspective 
of a well-informed outsider can afford important insights, participants might adapt their 
behaviours or utterances in particular ways. I hope that carrying out interviews, follow-up 
conversations and analysis in a reflexive and sensitive manner, drawing on many years of 
research experience in South Africa, and supplementing interview data with observational 
methods goes some way towards actively addressing this key methodological concern. 
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their victimisation experiences, although the vast majority chose to speak in detail about 
them. The forms of victimisation that study participants had experienced included: the killing 
of relatives, torture, detention without trial, rape and other sexual violence, shootings by 
police or other apartheid state organisations, maiming, forced removal, lack of access to 
education, healthcare, employment and political rights. Some used their accounts to construct 
narratives of their active contribution to the liberation struggle.  
A further 11 interviews with human rights campaigners and victim group activists 
were conducted  in Johannesburg and Cape Town, incorporating themes such as victim 
support policies and funding for support groups. These interviews served to contextualise 
data from the interviews with victims and provided insights into their organisations’ 
programmes, the structural issues surrounding victim support, changes in policy and funding 
environments and the current socio-economic and developmental challenges in South Africa.  
Moreover, I conducted six additional interviews with former Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) staff, asking participants to reflect on their experiences of South Africa’s 
TJ mechanisms from the vantage point of a relatively mature post-conflict society. Data from 
these interviews gave important insights into their perceptions of limitations and benefits of 
the truth commission but also highlighted their understandings of the finite and linear 
temporality of the transitional justice process, some characterising it as ‘having had its time’, 
happening a long time ago or ‘done and dusted’.11 The usually vastly more privileged 
perspective and different structural location of civil society organisers and former TRC staff 
may account for differences and contradictions between their understandings of the ongoing 
needs of victims at this stage of South Africa’s democracy and the experiences of the 
                                                            
11 Direct quotes from interviews with former TRC staff, 18 February 2011, Cape Town and 
with former TRC staff, 12 November 2011, Johannesburg. 
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interviewed victims/ survivors themselves.12 
My analysis of interview transcripts and field notes was informed by a constructivist 
grounded theory approach, which emphasises the reflexive meaning-making and meaning-
interpretation of research participants and researchers and the subjective experiences and 
narratives of participants (Charmaz 2006). Qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) was 
used to manage the relatively large amount of data that were gathered, and to develop and 
refine a cross-sectional coding index through open coding. This involved a series of reflexive 
readings to identify codes, initially following relatively closely topics that had been included 
in the interview schedule (such as victim identity, justice, compromise and current life 
circumstances), and then to further develop additional themes that emerged, such as 
continuity, change, structural violence, waiting, struggle, loss, recognition, regret, sacrifice, 
the next generation, exclusion, memorialisation. In addition to cross-sectional coding,  I also 
used more free-form styles of analysis, for example focusing more holistically on individual 
participants’ narratives and biographies, and examining transcripts for significant terms and 
metaphors (such as ‘still struggling’, ‘being left behind’, ‘moving on’). Concepts such as the 
dimensions of temporal conflicts were developed from memos and from further focused 
coding (Charmaz 2006).  
 
4. Memories and present-day victimisation  
Memories can have an important role in victims’ positioning in the post-conflict dispensation. 
Some participants are able to construct their past victimisation as essentially empowering, 
confirming their place in, and contribution to, a democratic South Africa. I asked Mike, a 
                                                            
12 Having noted these differences in structural location and the mostly linear understandings 
of the peace processes amongst non-victim participants, it is important to state that all non-
victim participants were nonetheless deeply sympathetic to the suffering of others and 
frequently acknowledged that victims felt ‘forgotten about’ (passim). 
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municipal government worker, how past violence – in his case, severe ill-treatment and 
several periods of detention without trial for his political activism – affects him today: 
In such a small community, when you walk around, people tell their kids: look, that 
guy here, he is one of the struggle heroes, one of the people that assisted us in 
becoming free […] From my side personally, when I am with my friends and activists 
of the past and we are socialising, we discuss what happened in the past. And that is 
actually nice now.13 
For Mike, this was facilitated by having received counselling after his release at the request 
of the African National Congress (ANC). Other interviewees with similar perceptions about 
the past linked their ability to cope with their own memory work or, more commonly, with 
their religious practice.  
 However, this was not a typical response amongst the study participants. Memories 
from the apartheid-era continued to negatively impact the majority of interviewees. Luisa 
from Khayelitsha was forcibly removed as a child. Later, as the wife of an imprisoned 
political activist, she was forced to raise her children on her own and was a victim of police 
violence. She spoke about present-day violence in her Cape Flats community, which includes 
frequent murders, crime and violent drug gangs: 
What is happening now, it makes me think back to apartheid time. And then 
sometimes I don’t feel right because maybe I think of the things I saw in apartheid, 
and the people they were dying and they were fighting for their freedom. That wasn’t 
very nice. Sometimes we had to sleep in the bushes. Because we were scared when 
we slept in the houses that something is going to happen. And when I think about this 
                                                            
13 Interview with Mike (46 years, male), 24 November 2011, Oudtshoorn. 
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time and that time, I don’t see any difference.14 
Ariz, a political activist and torture victim, similarly describes how memories of the past are 
evoked by contemporary experiences:   
[Traumatic memories] come from time to time, to be honest with you. Especially 
when you find yourself in the position, unemployed, you have a family that you need 
to support, and you ask yourself, what was all this effort that we put in. Not that we 
.... it was a principle fight, but if you look at yourself and where you are now, and the 
same people that fought alongside you it seems as if they have turned their backs on 
you.15 
The sentiment of new elites having ‘turned their backs’ was voiced in a large number of 
interviews; others expressed it in terms of betrayed promises, having been forgotten about 
and being made to wait, as Martin – a pastor who suffered detention and torture for his 
political stance during apartheid and now lives in a container with his wife and child – does 
here:  
If I stay in a shack prior to ’94, then here comes ’94, the country has changed, we are 
in a democracy, my needs will be answered, and we have been promised that things 
will change. Housing will be there, electricity will be there, water will be there. But 
now you are still sitting there, still waiting, for a house, still waiting for whatever. 
And don’t get. And that brings the bitterness.16 
Both of these accounts epitomise the structural violence that many participants are exposed 
to, for example involving long-term unemployment, lack of formal housing, poverty, and lack 
                                                            
14 Interview with Luisa (63 years, female), 8 November 2011, Khayelitsha.  
15 Interview with Ariz (45 years, male), 22 November 2011, Mossel Bay.  
16 Interview with Martin (52 years, male), 21 November 2011, Mossel Bay. 
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of access to basic services. But they also reveal participants’ senses of waiting for things to 
change, waiting for recognition for their contributions and waiting for redistribution.  
 Violence in the post-conflict era is also direct in some cases. Munia witnessed the 
murders of two of her grandchildren and one of her daughters in recent years due to gang 
violence in Bonteheuwel near Cape Town where she lives. She struggles most with the 
impunity the perpetrators continue to enjoy, all of which are known to her. In talking about 
the past, she says:  
I am so lonely and I am sitting there alone in the room, and I am thinking back, how it 
was at that time, and how it is now. And the difference. Because at that time 
everything was .... how to say that, everyone was willing to do something, but now 
nothing is going.17 
Other studies have linked inactivity, as Munia describes it here (or exclusion from the world 
of work, as in Ariz’ account earlier), with victims’ difficulties to cope with trauma (Igreja et 
al. 2009). What is more, the word ‘sitting’ has temporal resonances with waiting – itself often 
associated with immobility – and is dichotomous to constructions of time associated with 
change, progress and movement. In addition to this binary of waiting/ moving forward, the 
above narratives evoke other binaries, for example active/passive, included/excluded and 
individualist post-apartheid South Africa/collectivist resistance. 
 Part of Munia’s sense of alienation arguably stems from the radically different 
temporal mode and temporal logic of liberal democratic South Africa. Contrary to what 
political and social elite discourses in South Africa might suggest though, she is not unwilling 
to ‘move on’ or to integrate into the post-conflict order. Rather, contemporary victimisation 
                                                            
17 Interview with Munia (67 years, female), 5 December 2011, Bonteheuwel. 
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experiences play a significant role in bringing back emotions about the past in her and others’ 
narratives reported in this section. Drawing on this evidence of violence in the contemporary 
era rekindling past memories, I next analyse interviewees’ constructions of time and 
victimhood, demonstrating that they appear continuous, rather than temporary or linear as is 
often implied in transitional justice and also in wider society.  
 Although some of the participants’ experiences are consistent with symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD,) for example anxiety and re-experience of traumatic 
memories through sensory flashbacks, this paper does not engage in detail with research on 
PTSD because of its culturally specific assumptions, its focus on the individual and the 
critique that it is not well suited to exploring the effects of structural violence.18 However, the 
literature on collective trauma (Bloom 2006, Mogapi 2011) or massive large-group trauma 
(Volkan 2004) discusses some of the issues raised in this article, such as the everyday trauma 
of sexual violence (Leclerk-Madlala 2009) and the intergenerational transmission of trauma 
(Volkan 2004). These approaches see trauma as shared and embedded in the social structure 
of communities, and consequently view healing as encompassing political, economic and 
social dimensions (Budryte et al. 2009).19  
 
5. The past as the present? Constructions of victimhood as continuous 
Perhaps due to ongoing victimisation experiences such as the ones described in the previous 
                                                            
18 For critiques, see e.g. Burstow (2005) and Moon (2009). Igreja et al. (2006) and Kaminer 
et al. (2008) examine PTSD associated with human rights abuses in Southern Africa. 
19 Manifestations of collective trauma, according to Mogapi (2011) and Volkan (2004), 
include fixation with the traumatic experience, the fragmentation of social capital, projection, 
avoidance and social reenactment. Some, but not all of these, were present in communities 
but it goes beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate collective trauma manifestation in 
South Africa. 
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section, some participants did not (or perhaps could not) clearly distinguish between 
apartheid past and post-apartheid present. Interviewees typically emphasised continuities with 
the past by highlighting that apartheid still exists: ‘I can tell you with confidence that 
apartheid is still rife in the Western Cape’; ‘you have this depth of an apartheid reality’; ‘we 
are coming towards the 20th anniversary [of the first democratic elections] but it is still the 
same.’20  
 Continued segregation, both educationally and residentially, in particular gave 
interviewees the impression that ‘nothing has changed’ (passim). For example, Anton, a 
public sector worker and former political prisoner, stressed the difficulty of overcoming the 
past if there is a perception that nothing changes:  
I would like to move forward. But […] my children are at a predominantly white school 
but their mother is teaching at a predominantly coloured school, where the access to 
equal amenities is not the same. Racial integration is only moving where whites 
predominantly are. Because you don’t see white children in Coloured and African 
schools. It is a one-way street. And that is the same with anything else in terms of racial 
integration. It is looking at this kind of thing where I don’t think we have reconciliation. 
It is more segregated than we were, just under a new name.21 
There has indeed only been a modest desegregation of schools, largely limited to middle class 
schools in urban areas, and patterns of residential segregation have remained mostly 
unchanged since 1994. Racial and class stratification reflects one another: while inter-racial 
socialisation might have increased for the wealthiest South Africans, the same is not true for 
                                                            
20 Extracts from interviews on 2 March 2011, Kraaifontein (53 years, male); 1 December 
2011, Cape Town (63 years, male); 5 December 2011, Bonteheuwel (67 years, female). 
21 Interview with Anton (50 years, male), 23 November 2011, George. 
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poorer households. It was common for township residents in the Cape Flats to have never 
visited central Cape Town, less than 30 km away.  Continued de facto segregation therefore 
serves as a very visible reminder of post-conflict continuities with the apartheid past. This is 
very much in contrast to the discourse of linear and teleological change and the notion of a 
clear break with the past that have been so strongly perpetuated in post-conflict South Africa. 
 There are other reasons for why past and present seemed continuous, rather than 
separated clearly as violent/ peaceful and democratic. For example, Sara, the widow of a 
political activist, shared her own experience of being raped and described sexual violence as 
an intergenerational pattern:  
When it [being raped] happened to my daughter who is passed away, I was so cross 
for this guy, I put him in jail immediately. And now my daughter is passed away, and 
now it happens to my granddaughter. And I tell her, is it a kind of sickness in our 
family that every one of my family must be going through, must be a victim? What 
have we done to deserve that?22 
Women are particularly marginalised during and after conflict; forms of victimisation – and 
subsequent reparative needs – tend to be different than those of male victims. What is more, 
women frequently become the sole breadwinner during mass violence, as was the case with 
Sara and also with Luisa who was cited above. Their narratives clearly highlight that, in 
contrast to a ‘transitional justice imaginary’ (Hinton 2013), experiences of violence and 
suffering do not belong to an (increasingly distant) apartheid past but were rather part and 
parcel of the supposedly peaceful and democratic post-conflict state. In their study of 
women’s experiences in post-war Mozambique, Igreja et al. (2006: 508) similarly highlight 
the ‘continuum of suffering and burden’ traumatised women experienced in post-war times, 
                                                            
22 Interview with Sara (47 years, female), 6 December 2011, Mitchells Plain. 
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partly as a result of the traditional gender roles they continued to perform. 
 A continuum of past and present also became apparent on the level of language. 
Respondents frequently used the present tense when they were discussing events in the past. I 
do not believe this is due to English being a second language for many respondents, but that 
the violence they experienced is conceptualised as still existing in the present. There was a 
sense in interviewees’ narratives of a continuum of violence and inequalities: ‘we are still like 
prisoners’23 and ‘we are still oppressed’24 were typical assessments of their lives today.  The 
dominant understanding in transitional justice is predicated on a linear perception of time. 
From this perspective, healing takes place progressively, victimhood is temporary and, after 
an appropriate amount of time has passed, it must be ‘overcome’. By contrast, understandings 
of victimhood and senses of time appear much more continuous in these victims’ narratives, 
with the persistence of multiple forms of violence and inequalities disrupting the supposed 
linear temporality of peace processes. 
 Similarly, the phrase ‘I am/ we are still struggling’ was ubiquitous in interviews: a 
whole range of participants employed this temporal construct to describe their lives in post-
conflict South Africa, for example in relation to domestic violence, poverty, democracy, land, 
rights and the transformation of the economy. In this way, they expressed perceived 
continuities with the violence of apartheid but arguably they also sought to evoke their 
successful contribution to the liberation struggle, which represents a time of political 
certainties, collectivism and playing an active and central role.   
 
                                                            
23 Interview with Solomon (52 years, male), 10 March 2011, Mandalay. 
24 Interview with Andile (50 years, male), 2 December 2011, Khayelitsha.  
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6.  Needing to ‘move on’: the socio-temporal marginalization of victimhood 
In this part of the article, I move from victims’ experiences to the broader social context, 
highlighting how victims and their needs have become increasingly marginalised through 
government policies, a general public ‘apartheid fatigue’, and the increasing side-lining of 
victim concerns in (funded) civil society. This marginalization was acutely felt by victims, 
whose perceptions of societal expectations to forget about the past are documented in the 
second part of this section.  
Turning first to the marginalisation of victim-related issues in policy, when the TRC 
first issued its reparations policy in 1998, the Mbeki government insisted that no such policy 
would be implemented until 2003 (when the amnesty hearings were to be completed). 
Besides a one-off payment to some victims, officially-recognised victims were therefore 
forced to wait for compensation for up to seven and a half years after their testimonies. In 
2005, the National Prosecution Authority’s (NPA) National Prosecuting Policy was amended, 
supposedly in order to address the ‘unfinished business’ of the TRC and to contribute to 
national unity. It now allowed for the discretion of the NPA’s director in pursuing criminal 
cases against persons who had been denied amnesty by the TRC. The TRC had referred more 
than 300 names to the NPA but only a handful of prosecutions were taken forward.25   
Reflecting this political marginalisation of victim issues, there is a public 
understanding that the past has been sufficiently dealt with. For some years, apartheid 
victimhood has been regarded as no longer relevant to the challenges of democratic South 
Africa: the country as a whole has ‘moved on’, the ‘conversation [about apartheid] is over’ 
(passim), as I was told frequently in interviews with civil society practioners and in 
                                                            
25 An alliance of civil society groups and the relatives of victims filed against the amendment 
in 2007 and it was struck down as an unconstitutional ‘back door amnesty’ by the 
Constitutional Court in 2008. 
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conversations with ordinary South Africans. One victim and civil society leader highlighted 
the gap between public perceptions of victims as caught up in the past, and victims’ unmet 
needs:  
At the time [of the TRC], in the nation, there were popular victims. In many respects 
their needs were not met, and so then time passed. And then the same group of 
popular victims became unpopular victims, and society had moved on, but their needs 
had not been met. And society says, but why are people still obsessed, but actually 
their needs had not been addressed.26 
It might be apt to speak of ‘apartheid fatigue’ in society. This term has been used in a 
number of contexts: the public’s weariness of the ANC’s tendency to blame the past for its 
service delivery failures27; a lack of interest in engagement with apartheid history by some 
sectors of society (Wale, 2014); and the intergenerational tensions between those that 
suffered and struggled and their born-free children with no first-hand memory of apartheid 
(about 40 % of the population). For example, a former TRC commissioner I interviewed 
argued that ‘the debate about apartheid is over,’ and that ‘people get very impatient when 
government spokesmen refer to present day problems as being inherited from apartheid. 
White people get angry and say we can’t go on blaming apartheid for everything. And black 
people are just tired of that argument. And young black people who don’t remember don’t 
                                                            
26 Interview with Stephen (62 years, male), 1 December 2011, Cape Town. 
27 For example, South Africa’s president Jacob Zuma went on record in 2010 for saying that 
apartheid could no longer be blamed for the problems the country was facing in relation to 
poverty, inequality and lack of service delivery. Many commentators in the public sphere 
read this as a long-overdue acknowledgement of responsibility for service delivery failure by 
the ANC. However, for a number of study participants, Zuma’s statement conveyed a sense 
that they should have moved on and yet another attempt by Government to marginalise their 
concerns. As one interviewee put it, ‘Now you don’t force me to be happy. Just like Zuma 
has said we can’t blame the apartheid, some of us feel that we will blame the apartheid until 
our grave’ (Interview with Cynthia [61 years, female], Masiphumelele, 10 November 2011).  
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want to know about that.’28  
The argument that there is a cultural pressure on victims to get over the past is further 
backed up by public opinion research, which shows declining support for the idea that the 
South African government should support victims of human rights abuse under apartheid 
(57.6 % overall); white South Africans are least likely to support redress measures for victims 
(33 %) (Wale 2014). Urbsaitis moreover contends that ‘as South Africans become even more 
temporally distant from 1994 […] reconciliation fatigue may be causing them to forget their 
reconciliation responsibilities towards victims and survivors of apartheid prematurely’ (2009: 
59).  
The assumption that the past has been sufficiently dealt with also means that there is 
little support accessible to those who struggle to come to terms with their past experiences. In 
the civil society sector, the very perception of once ‘popular’ victims as ‘still obsessed’, as in 
the above quote, provides a significant challenge for South Africa’s few remaining victim 
support organisations such as Khulumani, The Trauma Centre for Survivors of Violence and 
Torture and the Institute for the Healing of Memories. Staff at these organisations stated in 
interviews that, to be able to attract funding from donors, they have had to not frame their 
work in terms of the apartheid past: ‘even with people saying that Apartheid is passé, it is true 
that it has moved. And even we have had it with [our organisation] we have had to update 
and try and exclude the apartheid kind of things.’29 This arguably adds to the discursive 
marginalisation of victim issues in the public sphere (also see Urbsaitis 2009). 
Notably, the claim that victims should long have moved on is most often voiced by 
political elites, as the following extract from an interview with the director of a victim 
                                                            
28 Interview with TRC commissioner, 15 February 2011, Cape Town. 
29 Interview with civil society organisation staff, 9 November 2011, Cape Town. 
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support organisation indicates:  
We have a huge section of our population who have been victims of torture, and those 
experiences have never been dealt with. We see a number of political activists very 
disillusioned by the status quo, and at the same time we see people who are now in 
power who were political activists saying in response to these people: but it is because 
you haven’t been able to move on. It’s because you are so stuck in the 80s. Well, why 
are they do stuck in the 80s? Could it be because their experiences have been so 
traumatic, that they are not able to move on? 30 
Civil society leaders regularly highlighted a gap between the new political and social elites 
and those who continued to consider themselves victims: ‘the conversation about apartheid is 
far from over. That is the problem, that’s why everything is falling apart at the moment. And 
then you have the members of parliament who are predominantly black who then think that 
they can speak for everybody because they are already over it, and so why shouldn’t 
everybody be alright.’31 This attitude of the elites might be a product of having access to 
resources that has allowed them to better deal with past traumas, be it through counselling 
after the transition, financial resources or a clear break with the past. For instance, some 
political activists who became victims of gross human rights violations received counselling 
at the behest of the ANC (as liberation movement); others began their political careers for the 
ANC, now ruling party, during the struggle. Conversely, the majority of victims (or their 
relatives) remained poor and have had little political leverage to push forward the issue of 
reparations.  
The sense of needing have overcome the past already and being out of sync with the 
                                                            
30 Interview (50 years, female), 14 March 2011, Cape Town. 
31 Interview (52 years, female), 8 March 2011, Johannesburg. 
26 
 
rest of society who have, was acutely felt. It was fairly typical for interviewees to report 
feeling a societal pressure to forget the past. For example, S’bu is a victim who subsequently 
became an MK32 soldier, thus also illustrating the blurred boundaries between victim and 
perpetrator. Asked how his past victimisation affected him, he said:  
You still feel the outcome of it. Even today. These people today they are living just to 
die, waiting for their day. Given up hope. You’ve got the wounds, spiritual and 
physical wounds, that are not easy to heal, each and every day you see that wound, 
there is a pain that is caused by the wound. I can hear a lot of stories that you should 
forget the past. You can never forget. You can forget the past if it did not affect you.33 
Similarly, Mustafa, who was targeted by security forces that bombed the youth centre he led 
in the 1980s, felt that there is no longer room for a victimhood identity today: 
I think I am still dealing with my victimhood. People sort of glibly talk about “you 
know we mustn’t talk about the apartheid era, and let’s forget about it”. I can’t forget 
about what I experienced, I can’t forget the deaths of people that I knew […] I can’t 
forget being teargassed every time I would go to a rally. I went to funeral after funeral 
after funeral, every month we were at two or three funerals of people who were killed 
by the state.34 
This perception of an obligation to forget the past might be associated with participants’ 
frustration that their stories have not adequately been told, as comes across in this extract: 
There is no opportunity for us at this moment, there is no platform for us to speak our 
                                                            
32 The MK, or Umkonto we Sizwe (‘The Spear of the Nation’) was the military arm of the  
    ANC, established in 1961. 
33 Interview with S’bu (63 years, male), 9 March 2011, Khayelitsha. 
34 Interview with Mustafa  (47 years, male), 2 March 2011, Cape Town. 
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minds, our inner feelings, how we felt at that moment when we went through that. 
Because people are saying today: apartheid was here, it’s gone, and don’t speak about 
apartheid, because it is gone. So you are not supposed to refer to apartheid, you are 
not supposed to speak about it. But […] for us to speak out, that is important to us. 35   
There was a common perception that official commemoration has only dealt with the national 
leaders, whose stories did not represent participants’ own locally diverse and uneven 
experiences of violence and struggle. It was in rural areas and townships where victims felt 
least represented and this is also where the perception of ‘being left behind’ was most clearly 
articulated. 36  
 
7. Temporal conflicts between individual healing and national reconciliation: 
permanent liminality? 
One way of thinking through the fundamental incongruence  – between victims temporalities 
and experiences of continued violence that were documented in sections 4 and 5, and the 
cultural and political expectations for them to have moved on that I outlined above – is as an 
expression of temporal conflicts between processes and experiences of individual healing and 
the demands of national reconciliation. In the name of national reconciliation and drawing a 
line under the violence of the past, post-conflict states (through their TJ mechanisms, or 
otherwise) might seek closure sooner than victims, ‘the state’s desire to build a new post-
conflict society often means […] asking survivors to engage in a premature closure before all 
the psychological processes around truth and recompense are fully internalized (Hamber & 
                                                            
35 Interview with Bongani (53 years, male), 23 February, Cape Town. 
36 Issues of memorialisation go beyond the scope of this paper but the data clearly highlight 
the insufficiencies, for victims, of official memorialization even in the context of South 
Africa where huge memorialization efforts and symbolic reparations were pursued and where 
the formerly oppressed have gained political power.  
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Wilson 2002: 44).  
The term reconciliation is of course far from uncontroversial and takes on different 
meanings according to the nature and extent of a given peace process, with one key question 
concerning the level of analysis: is it an individual, community-level or national process? In 
this study, the term was understood by most participants as a top-level, official process (often 
associated with the TRC), which they saw as contrasting with their own everyday efforts to 
live with the historically defined other, forgive others, or finding closure within themselves.37 
Although interviewees’ detailed conceptions of reconciliation go beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is significant that ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ reconciliation was by the vast majority linked to 
achieving redistribution and social and economic justice. To cite just one example for this, I 
asked Nomvula, a writer and arts sector professional, whether she felt reconciled: 
I would be reconciled had the economic situation been closed a bit. Had there been 
only a slight gap between the rich and the poor, then maybe one would be reconciled. 
But when I go back to the township where I stay, even though I may have a car, a 
much better home, but when I look around me, when I look at the effects that the 
apartheid government had done on the people, then I begin to feel, no, reconciliation 
it might be there in my heart, but around me, it is really not there.38 
 
The TRC itself, as the main transitional justice mechanism, was arguably more 
successful in promoting a shared understanding of the past than it was in helping individual 
victims: participation did not necessarily benefit victims in the long term (Stein et al., 2008). 
Official transitional mechanisms necessarily work on different time frames than individual 
                                                            
37 For this reason, when talking about reconciliation as part of South Africa’s nation-building 
project in the early post-apartheid period, it is referred to as ‘national reconciliation’ 
throughout this paper. 
38 Interview with Nomvula (45 years, female), 6 December 2011, Cape Town.  
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processes of healing and grieving. In the South African case, the temporally limited nature of 
any truth commission was exacerbated by operating a closed-list approach with a final date 
for applications. That victims still continue to campaign for a re-opening of the TRC’s 
registration process can be read as a challenge to the dominant linear and teleological 
transitional justice narrative, as a way of grappling with the past through their own temporal 
practices.  
Similarly challenging the temporality of transitional justice, a considerable number of 
participants in this study voiced regret at their initial refusal to submit to the TRC and often 
expressed their hopes for a revival of the commission.39 As one activist put it: ‘In retrospect, 
if the TRC was happening today, I would go. I think it is important to tell our stories. I would 
advise other comrades as well: let us go and tell our stories.‘40 A woman who had been shot 
by apartheid police and is left with pellets in her leg said: ‘I wonder, would it have been 
better for us [to submit to the TRC], and sitting then with some money from the state or 
whatever reparation process they went through. They must make another truth 
commission.’41 
Another example is provided by debates around the Special Dispensation for 
Presidential Pardons, introduced by President Mbeki in 2005 (and continued by President 
Zuma) to pardon political perpetrators who had not participated in the Amnesty Committee. 
This controversial policy was framed as beneficial for national unity, with government 
arguing that it would allow the country to deal with the unfinished business of the TRC and 
to find closure. In the meantime, victims were fighting the proposal as a backdoor amnesty. 
                                                            
39 It goes beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore why many activists actively chose 
not to participate in the TRC at the time; reasons include refusing compensation for what they 
saw as their sacrifice for freedom and commitment to secrecy. Many others wished to submit 
but say that they were not made aware of the process or submitted too late. 
40 Interviews with Fred (46 years, male), 23 November 2011, George. 
41 Interview with Phila (72 years, female), 6 December 2011, Nyanga. 
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However, perhaps the clearest illustration of the temporal conflicts between individual 
and national requirements is that victims were forced to wait for compensation. While TRC-
recognised victims had to wait for the payment of the individual reparations grant up to seven 
and a half years after their testimonies to the commission, perpetrators immediately benefited 
from the amnesty process without having to wait. Responding to criticism about the delay in 
payment, Mbeki said that individuals had not struggled for money. This was perceived by 
interviewees as insulting and hypocritical, given that today’s political elites were clearly 
material beneficiaries of the new order. Indeed, some individuals and communities are still 
waiting: a recent report identifies several severely harmed communities where reparative 
work is still meant to be implemented (South African Coalition for Transnational Justice 
2012), including exhumations and reburials, community reparations and social services 
provision. In late 2013, the Department of Justice announced that the money in the 
President’s Fund should fund infrastructure projects in 18 townships, without clarifying why 
other TRC-designating communities were not chosen or re-evaluating survivors’ needs. 
The fact that waiting mirrors unequal power relations, has negative impacts on 
people’s emotional and material well-being and can exacerbate social inequalities makes the 
timing of reparations a crucial issue. The delayed payments of reparations in South Africa 
appear as a way to exert temporal domination (cf. Reid 2013): victims – mostly poor and with 
little political leverage – are made to wait for compensation and their ongoing hopes for 
redress and redistribution are dismissed as violating the goals of the liberation struggle. 
Importantly, waiting can be an aspect of immobility; not knowing if and when compensation 
will be received has left some victims precisely unable to move on and has fixed them in 
waiting. Beyond the impacts of waiting, victims can also be understood as socio-temporally 
marginalised for contradicting ‘proper’ transitional justice time and defying societal 
expectations about the time their victimhood ‘should’ last. By not conforming to the linear 
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temporality of the transitional process, they are rendered anachronistic. This is not to deny 
that the marginalisation of participants is socio-economic; rather, that temporal domination – 
such as being made to wait for compensation or recognition and experiencing pressures to 
overcome the past – is a key dimension of their marginalisation, and is intrinsically linked to 
their multiple senses of exclusion.  
Waiting can be understood as a liminal condition (Lahad 2012; Sutton, Vigneswaran 
et al. 2011) – an ambiguous and uncertain, but temporary, in-between stage. Victims and 
survivors in particular are said to inhabit liminal social spaces; they are ‘part of society but 
removed from society’ (Hamber & Wilson 2002: 38). Transitional justice institutions 
themselves have been described as liminal in that they are supposed to enable the passage 
from violence to peace time and it is where survivors seek to resolve liminality (Wilson 
2001). However, the notion of permanent or fixed liminality might better capture the 
experiences of participants that continue to deal with their victimhood two decades on. In 
contrast to the earlier anthropological literature on liminality, Bauman (1992) has suggested 
that different parts of a post-conflict society might remain in a liminal state for a long time. 
From the perspective of transitional justice time, victimhood already has a temporal 
orientation attached to it: is a temporary state in the passage from a violent to a peaceful 
society, and only as such might it be an acceptable form of liminality within that narrative of 
teleological progress. When victims continue to ‘be obsessed’ and ‘fail to move on’ however, 
they are marginalised for not fitting into the post-conflict order and become fixed in 
liminality – continuous victimhood disrupts the notion of a clear break between the past and 
the present, which the post-conflict state cannot tolerate. 
 
Conclusions 
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This paper has developed a temporal analysis of victimhood in post-conflict societies. The 
issue of time and temporality has not often been explicitly considered in peace and conflict 
studies. I have suggested here that it can provide deeper insights into the dynamics and 
challenges of such societies and into victims’ lived experiences. Transitions are commonly 
imagined as linear and, in order to ‘work’, must involve clear breaks between violent past and 
peaceful present. By contrast, participants in this study did not always distinguish between 
past and present. The incongruence, between the continuous nature of their victimhood and 
the supposed linearity of peace processes, is one of several dimensions of temporal conflict in 
post-conflict societies that the paper made explicit by adopting a time-sensitive approach. A 
temporal conflict was also identified in relation to social and political expectations about the 
timing, duration and pace of victims’ healing. Transitional justice and post-conflict time are 
dominant modes of time that legitimise power relations. By not ‘moving on’ and failing to 
conform to the appropriate time, victims are dismissed as anachronistic and can become fixed 
in permanent liminality.  
 In concluding, I want to draw attention to a wider temporal conflict that might 
characterise settings beyond South Africa. It derives from the tension between the (fast-
paced) socio-temporal logic of a free market economy and that of a society that must (slowly 
and over a long period) deal with the legacies of a violent past; that is to say, the tension 
between neoliberalism and redistribution. As noted earlier, a neoliberal economic regime was 
quickly adopted during and after the democratic transition. Scholars of time and speed have 
shown that there is an asynchronicity between liberal democracy and economic 
neoliberalism: ‘fast-paced, instrumentally oriented economic neoliberalism […] is focused far 
more on the short-term horizon and on doing things ever more quickly’ (Hassan 2009: 6), 
while the former involves slow deliberative processes that are not conducive to the 
imperatives of high-speed societies.  
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 I argue that, given the demands and requirements of post-conflict societies, this 
asynchronicity between democracy and neoliberalism is yet more pronounced. This is for two 
reasons. Firstly, temporal modes are not neutral: temporal hierarchies render speed privileged 
over slow processes; fast is synonymous with profitable efficiency, whereas slow means 
inefficiency and backwardness (Adam 2004). When success is equated with speed, future-
orientation and progress in acceleration societies (Scheuerman 2009), this might well 
contribute to expectations and pressures about the pace in which victims’ healing should take 
place. The very discourse of needing to ‘move on’ that was documented in this paper is one 
expression of this focus on speed and immediacy. Secondly, the kind of economic and social 
change that neoliberal policies seek to implement involves a very different temporal logic 
than the logic underlying victim support and redistribution policies. For example, BEE has a 
time horizon of more than one generation and is aimed at redressing the legacies of hundreds 
of years of colonial and apartheid discrimination. Consequently, there are conflicts between 
the demands of neoliberal acceleration societies and the patience that is required in post-
conflict societies in order to achieve redistribution, redress and social reconstruction.  
 This research has a number of implications for the study of conflict and peace. First of 
all, although I have predominantly analysed issues pertaining to victimhood here, time is a 
relevant category for understanding different aspects of post-conflict societies such as justice, 
truth, reintegration and redistribution. Secondly, while victims’ senses of time were examined 
through the South African case, such an analysis and the associated typology of temporal 
conflicts can be applied to other post-conflict settings. For example, theoretical approaches to 
the politics of waiting might be employed to better understand the impact of victim support 
policies in transitional and post-conflict contexts such as Northern Ireland, Nepal and 
Colombia. Thirdly, a temporal analysis can be particularly useful for examining the 
challenges that mature post-conflict societies face a relatively long time after transition and 
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for recognising the long-term requirements of victims. Lastly, the arguments about an 
asynchronicity between neoliberalism and redistribution places into sharp relief debates about 
what kind of economic and political system should be introduced after the end of conflict, 
and ultimately also whether transitional justice, both in its institutional and scholarly aspects, 
needs to take account of issues around economic justice that it has historically excluded.  
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